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LEGAL PROMISE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay argues that the “psychological contract”—the 
parties’ respective, subjective, idiosyncratic understandings of their 
contractual obligations to one another—is important and 
predictable.  The common law of contract tells us how to discern the 
legal promise.  By contrast, the “psychological contract” describes 
how the parties themselves understand their agreements, an 
inquiry that refers to the legal rules but also relies heavily on 
evidence from behavioral decision research: psychology, 
experimental economics, and empirical legal scholarship.  The goal 
of this argument is to uncover the coherent structure of empirical 
contracts findings.  This analysis pulls out the common mechanisms 
underlying a broad range of behavioral findings and offers a 
framework for predicting behavioral effects in real-world decisions. 
Contracts scholars have always done a lot of talking about 
promising.  Is a contractual agreement the same thing as a 
promise?1  Is it wrong to break a contractual promise?2  Is the 
contract a promise to perform or a promise to either perform or pay 
 
  J.D.; Ph.D., Psychology; Assistant Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  Many thanks to David Hoffman, Stephanos Bibas, 
and Jean Galbraith for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Bonnie 
White for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (2009) (“A natural account of the relationship 
between contract and promise holds that legal liability in contract enforces a 
corresponding moral responsibility for a promise.”); Seana Shiffrin, The 
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 709 (2007) 
(“[A]lthough the legal doctrines of contract associate legal obligations with 
morally binding promises, the contents of the legal obligations and the legal 
significance of their breach do not correspond to the moral obligations and the 
moral significance of their breach.”). 
 2. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 16 (1981) (“An individual is morally bound to keep his promises 
because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function is to give 
grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised performance.  To 
renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he 
intentionally did invite.”). 
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damages?3  Philosophers, judges, and economists have all turned 
their attention to these questions in the last century.4  It should not 
be a surprise, then, to find that empirical legal scholars have begun 
to weigh in.  Recent behavioral work on contract and promise has 
yielded a torrent of compelling results.  A sampling: individuals 
prefer specific performance to money damages;5 are more likely to 
comply with negotiated agreements than take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts;6 are less likely to perform when a contract has been 
assigned;7 and put more effort into performance when they are 
threatened with a deduction than when they are promised a bonus.8  
These kinds of findings pose a real challenge.  On the one hand, they 
offer empirical evidence of how people navigate their legal and social 
worlds, and this is something that any model of contract behavior 
ought to capture.  On the other hand, there are literally dozens of 
discrete results like these, and there is no obvious way to 
understand when they matter, how they interact with one another, 
and how to use them to build a better model of contracting in the 
real world. 
Many scholars have recognized that the content of parties’ 
understandings of their mutual obligations is not fully encapsulated 
by the contract terms and background law.9  However, if you cannot 
figure out what parties think they are agreeing to by looking at the 
 
 3. E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of 
Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 687 (1986) (“Economic analyses 
reject the view of contract as promise, and replace it with the idea that contract 
law ought to promote ‘efficiency.’”). 
 4. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence 
of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1223–24 (1984) (reviewing ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract 
Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 832 (2003); 
Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1349, 1349 (2009). 
 5. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fault in Contracts: A Psychological Approach, in 
FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 298 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 
2010). 
 6. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental 
Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, J. LEGAL STUD. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1640245. 
 7. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Transferring Trust: Reciprocity Norms and 
Assignment of Contract, J. EMP. LEGAL. STUD. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984656. 
 8. Richard R. W. Brooks et al., Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing 
Increases Effort (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 438, at 62, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990226. 
 9. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 519, 553–56 (2001) (explaining that the rise of the “boundaryless 
career” has resulted in employment contracts that only vaguely define 
employees’ duties, leaving out many details to be filled in later). 
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contract or looking at the legal default rules, it begins to seem 
pointless to even try to apprehend the parties’ subjective 
understandings and expectations—but that need not be the case.  
The baseline commonsense view is that contracts are promises to 
perform, and breaching a contract is morally wrong in the same way 
that breaking a promise is morally wrong.10  Furthermore, empirical 
research on informal norms in legal decision making has yielded 
evidence that people draw on a set of consistent moral intuitions and 
social norms to understand the substance of the promissory 
obligation.11  Behavioral economics has been criticized for offering 
lists of biases and heuristics but no way of predicting the magnitude 
of each effect or how they interact with other incentives and 
constraints in legal decision making.12  The goal of this Essay is to 
discern some organizing principles for applying psychological 
research to the law and practice of contractual transactions. 
The concept of the psychological contract is drawn mainly from 
organizational behavior research.13  Contract law assumes that 
parties understand their contracts to include both the permissible 
terms included in the contract and the background rules of 
contract.14  Psychological research on contractual exchange, 
interpreted broadly to include basic experimental research on trust 
and reciprocity, has offered three main contributions to the field.  
First, a series of findings suggests that most people do not know the 
background rules of contract and assume that the applicable rules 
are in line with their own moral intuitions.15  Second, in many cases, 
parties understand their contractual obligations to encompass 
general moral and social norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.16  
Third, parties incorporate relationship-specific informal norms and 
agreements into the psychological contract, even when those norms 
 
 10. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral 
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 405–07 (2009) 
(showing that participants in a series of experiments were sensitive to the 
moral context of breach of contract). 
 11. Id. at 420–21. 
 12. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic 
Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768–69 (1998) (arguing that without a 
theoretical explanation for behavioral results, we need a stronger theoretical 
link among results and a better-developed sense of the complexity of real 
decision-making environments). 
 13. Denise M. Rousseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in 
Organizations, 2 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 121, 134 (1989). 
 14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 cmts. a–c (1981) (noting 
that a contract consists of terms upon which both parties agree, contract terms 
supplied by the law, and contract terms codified by statute). 
 15. Shiffrin, supra note 1. 
 16. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963). 
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and agreements are clearly outside, or even in conflict with, the 
explicit provisions of the written agreement.17 
In other words, the research that bears on the psychological 
contract is about three different kinds of normative expectations: the 
normative expectations of the legal system, the normative 
expectations of our society, and the normative expectations of the 
counterparty.18  This parsing of existing empirical literature has 
important benefits for contracts scholarship.  The first is that it 
takes a series of ad hoc findings and pulls out the underlying 
mechanisms that connect them.  The other advantage this kind of 
analysis offers is a way to think about how a given result matters for 
a particular context.  For example, how should we think about 
cognitive bias in a context in which the parties are usually 
sophisticated repeat players?  How will parties represented by 
counsel differ from those who negotiate directly?  This analysis 
suggests as a starting point to ask what the parties in question 
believe that others expect of them and what their incentives are for 
taking those expectations seriously. 
The argument proceeds in five steps.  Part I introduces the 
concept of a psychological contract and identifies the overlaps and 
notable divergences between psychological and legal contracts.  Part 
II presents common misconceptions about contract law that shape 
the way that ordinary citizens understand their legal obligations in 
contract.  Part III argues that most people believe that their 
contractual promises include implicit commitments to honor moral 
and social norms like promise keeping and reciprocity.  Part IV 
argues that even when parties ignore or disclaim background social 
norms in their contract relationships, they are nonetheless attentive 
to party-specific norms, taking into account the counterparty’s 
legitimate expectations.  Finally, Part V takes up some persistent 
questions and particular contract doctrines in light of this analysis. 
I.  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT 
A contract is a promise that the legal system recognizes; the 
psychological contract is the promise that the parties themselves 
recognize.  Denise Rousseau, a professor and researcher of 
organizational behavior, first argued for the existence of 
psychological contracts distinct from written, enforceable contracts 
in the employment context: 
 
 17. See Rousseau, supra note 13, at 123 (“Where interactions occur over 
time, and continued interaction over time is expected, beliefs regarding what 
parties owe to each other can arise both from overt promises as well as through 
numerous factors that the parties may take for granted.”). 
 18. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND 
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 11 (2006). 
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The term psychological contract refers to an individual’s 
beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal 
exchange agreement between that focal person and another 
party.  Key issues here include the belief that a promise has 
been made and a consideration offered in exchange for it, 
binding the parties to some set of reciprocal obligations.19 
In some ways, the psychological contract looks much like the 
actual contract.  Both are meant to contain the terms of a bargained-
for exchange.  The psychological contract is not about bare 
promising; rather, it refers to the parties’ expectations of one 
another in a mutually beneficial deal.20  Psychologically, at least, the 
parties believe that their obligations are mutual and supported by 
consideration.21  And, indeed, agreement about the terms of 
exchange is good for productivity.  Guillermo Dabos and Denise 
Rousseau studied employer-employee dyads in university research 
centers and assessed the extent of consistency between their 
respective interpretations of the exchange agreement.22  They found 
that more agreement about the nature of the contract terms 
(mutuality) and the implicit exchanges they represented 
(reciprocity) was associated with measurably higher joint 
productivity.23  The psychological contract is not primarily 
characterized by an employee’s unrealistic list of expectations.  
Rather, it is often an objectively reasonable, and even explicitly 
agreed-upon, schema for the terms of the exchange.24 
Also like the real contract context, breach of the psychological 
contract has to do with the failure of one party to perform, not with 
the broader category of disappointed expectations.  Employers may 
fail to live up to their employees’ expectations in many ways.  A 
company may be less successful than expected, or the coworkers less 
friendly or helpful, but an employee will not necessarily feel 
betrayed in these situations.  The psychological contract literature 
argues that employees experience breach when they believe a 
 
 19. Rousseau, supra note 13, at 123. 
 20. Id. at 130. 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981) (“A performance or 
return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for 
his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”). 
 22. Guillermo E. Dabos & Denise M. Rousseau, Mutuality and Reciprocity 
in the Psychological Contracts of Employees and Employers, 89 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL.  52, 52 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 60–62. 
 24. See id. at 69 (“The bedrock of functional employment relationships are 
exchanges between workers and employees characterized by mutuality or 
shared understanding of all parties’ obligations and reliance on their reciprocal 
commitments.”). 
W06_WILKINSON-RYAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  8:59 AM 
848 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
benefit is either owed or promised.25  In turn, the understanding of 
what is owed and promised depends on the contract schema.  A 
schema is a mental model of a concept or category, sometimes 
described as “a theory of reality.”26  It “refers to cognitive structures 
of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with 
specific instances” and guides both the encoding of new information 
and the retrieval of existing knowledge and memory.27  The schema 
of a particular contract includes prior beliefs about the nature of the 
domain as well as explicit rights and obligations iterated during the 
agreement stage.28  What this means in practical terms is that 
people pay particular attention to schema-relevant information.  
The schema for “dog” includes things like four legs, fur, and barking.  
We can all agree that a dog with one missing leg is still a dog, but 
such a deviation from the schematic expectation is surprising and 
salient.  In the employment contract world, the “cashier” schema 
presumably includes the handling of money and being polite to 
customers but probably does not include janitorial tasks.  It should 
not be surprising that an employee hired to be a cashier would feel 
taken advantage of if it turned out that her responsibilities included 
cleaning toilets, whereas one hired to be a janitor would not. 
In other ways, of course, psychological contracts differ 
substantially from legal contracts—that is why they are a subject 
worthy of separate consideration.  First, the psychological contract 
is, by definition, subjective.29  Its terms do not depend on actual or 
even constructive mutual agreement.  To take a famous example as 
counterpoint, consider Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. 
International Sale Corp.,30 in which two parties to a contract have 
divergent interpretations of the meaning of “chicken.”31  The court 
interpreting the contract goes to considerable effort to figure out 
what the parties could reasonably be understood to have meant in 
order to determine the nature of the true contract.32  Assessing the 
 
 25. Denise M. Rousseau, Schema, Promise & Mutuality: The Building 
Blocks of the Psychological Contract, 74 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 511, 
511 (2001). 
 26. See, e.g., Seymour Epstein, The Self-Concept Revisited, or a Theory of a 
Theory, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 404, 409–10 (1973). 
 27. Susan Fiske & Patricia Linville, What Does the Schema Concept Buy 
Us?, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 543, 543 (1980). 
 28. See id. at 548 (explaining that a schema allows people to “integrate 
stimuli into a recognizable pattern” by indexing its characteristics). 
 29. See Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the 
Psychological Contract: Not the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORG. BEHAV. 245, 
246 (1994) (emphasizing that a psychological contract is formed based on the 
belief of only one party). 
 30. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 31. Id. at 117. 
 32. Id. at 121. 
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meaning of the psychological contract is much easier: the contract is 
what each of the parties thinks it is.  The fact that there are two 
psychological contracts does not affect the validity of either one.33  
The psychological contract is defined by one party’s understanding 
of her agreement with another, written or unwritten, legally 
enforceable or not. 
Second, unlike a legal contract, the psychological contract is not 
necessarily enforceable.  Existing scholarship on psychological 
contracts deals almost entirely with unenforceable terms.34  This is 
partly a quirk of the history of psychological contracts, which have 
been studied mainly in the context of employment contracts.35  
Although formal employer-employee contracts certainly exist, they 
are necessarily incomplete and quickly out-of-date.36  However, 
these unwritten and unenforceable terms are often of great import 
to the parties.37  For example, an employee may take a lower-paying 
job because she understands that the employer is offering long-term 
stability (for example, government work).  In the same vein, an 
employer may offer a raise to an employee expected to be more 
productive in a new role.  These are contracts that are rarely 
enforceable in court and, indeed, are not understood by the parties 
themselves to have legal ramifications.38 
The idea of the psychological contract has purchase outside of 
the employment context and ought to be taken seriously even for 
contracts that the parties believe to be legally meaningful.  In the 
framework I am proposing, I am assuming that every legal 
agreement involves a psychological contract.  On one end of the 
spectrum, we might have a straightforward one-shot deal negotiated 
 
 33. See Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 29, at 246 (explaining how two 
psychological contracts can be created simultaneously). 
 34. See, e.g., Jackie Coyle-Shapiro & Ian Kessler, Consequences of the 
Psychological Contract for the Employment Relationship: A Large Scale Survey, 
37 J. MGMT. STUD. 903, 907–09 (2000). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 903 (reporting the results of a large-scale survey that 
found that most employees and managers believe that most employees have 
experienced contract breach); Denise Rousseau & R.J. Anton, Fairness and 
Implied Contract Obligations in Job Terminations: The Role of Contributions, 
Promises and Performance, 12 J. ORG. BEHAV. 287, 287 (1991) (using empirical 
research to demonstrate that judgments about terminating employees are 
affected by seniority and past commitments of long-term employment). 
 36. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems 
Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 17 (2005) 
(characterizing the “new workplace” as “dynamic” and requiring flexibility and 
mobility). 
 37. See id. at 19–24 (delineating some values that characterize the informal 
relationship between employees and employers). 
 38. But see id. at 24 (suggesting that dispute resolution should be used to 
resolve conflicts arising out of uncodified employee expectations as a means of 
preserving the “new workplace”). 
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by attorneys for which the psychological contract is entirely 
captured by the written terms.  At the other extreme, buyers and 
sellers may have long-term relationships in which they exchange 
written forms but explicitly agree that their deal is governed by the 
informal arrangements that they have worked out over time.  In 
other words, in some cases, the overlap of the enforceable legal 
contract and the psychological contract may be complete, and in 
other cases, nearly nonexistent.  My contention is only that every 
contract involves parties who have some mental picture of their 
rights and obligations, whether this picture is in conflict with the 
legal contract, complementary to the legal contract, or exactly the 
same as the legal contract. 
The implications of the psychological contract for parties’ 
behavior have been taken up mainly as questions of when employees 
perceive breach of that contract and how they respond.39  The 
remedies for breach of contract are typically negotiated between the 
parties with the knowledge that a remedy at law is available.  The 
remedy for breach of the psychological contract is essentially self-
help—retaliation or exit.  One study of graduate management 
alumni from a top business school found that over half of the 
respondents reported that their employers had breached the 
psychological contract, and the psychological contract breach had 
real consequences.40  Violations were correlated with employee 
dissatisfaction and high turnover.41  Researchers have also observed 
that when employees perceive a breach, they become more likely to 
shirk.42  This kind of effect is largely mediated by the effect of 
breach on trust.  When one party perceives the other party’s breach 
as a betrayal, the loss of trust in turn erodes the non-breaching 
party’s commitment to the contract, which leads to employees 
putting in less effort or even quitting.43 
As I have noted, most work on the psychological contract is 
interested in what happens when the contract is breached.  But the 
concept of a psychological contract has implications for other 
questions I will take up here.  How do parties decide whether to 
breach their contract?  How does the background law affect the 
psychological contract?  How does the actual contract affect the 
 
 39. Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel 
Betrayed: A Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops, 22 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 226, 227, 230–33 (1997) (outlining a model for an employee’s 
cognitive processes preceding perception of breach of the psychological 
contract). 
 40. Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 29, at 245. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Sandra L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41 
ADMIN. SCI. Q.  574, 574 (1996). 
 43. Id. at 577. 
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psychological contract?  In other words, what is the content of the 
psychological contract? 
When parties are trying to figure out their contractual 
obligations, they ask themselves what is expected of them.  
Philosopher Cristina Bicchieri has argued that the idea of 
“normative expectations” is crucial for understanding when a norm 
exists.44  We know that a particular behavior is a norm not just 
because a lot of people are doing it but because we understand that 
other people believe that we ought to follow the rule.45  Here, I am 
arguing that the psychological contract is informed by a party’s 
understanding of three sets of normative expectations, those of the 
legal system, of culture or society, and of the other party. 
Norms can affect behavior via multiple pathways.  People may 
choose to follow a norm because they believe that the norm will be 
enforced, either formally or informally, or because they believe that 
they are morally obligated to follow the norm irrespective of the 
prospect of sanctions.46  In the Part of this Essay on legal norms, I 
am primarily referring to the rules that parties think will be 
enforced, though I do not discount the possibility that most people 
think following the law is the right thing to do even when the 
possibility of punishment is infinitesimal.  In the subsequent Parts 
on social and party-specific norms, the core of the argument is about 
“moral norms”—norms that people believe they should follow even 
without threat of sanctions.47 
II.  LEGAL NORMS 
What help could psychology possibly be in understanding 
positive law?  The most facially plausible answer is probably “none.”  
If you want to know what the legal system expects of you, surely you 
should start looking up statutes or checking the case law—the 
cognitive processes of the citizens bound by a set of legal norms are 
not especially useful for understanding the actual legal rules.  Be 
that as it may, we may still want to worry about the cases in which 
parties do not know the legal rule or norm, but they think they do.  
As long as we are in the realm of private decision making, parties’ 
predictions about a particular legal response matter, irrespective of 
their basis in actual legal rules. 
 
 44. See Cristina Bicchieri & Erte Xiao, Do the Right Thing: But Only if 
Others Do So, J. BEHAV. DECISIONMAKING (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/ppe/documents/DotheRightThing.10.2.08.pdf 
(defining “normative expectations” as “what we believe others think we ought to 
do”). 
 45. BICCHIERI, supra note 18, at 11. 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. Id. at 20. 
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This is essentially a new twist on an old argument.  Robert 
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser introduced the idea of the law as a 
framework within which individuals act when they described 
“bargaining in the shadow of the law.”48  The basic thrust of their 
proposition is that legal rules can serve as bounds or frames on 
private ordering.49  In many cases, the law does not and need not 
define parties’ entitlements or obligations specifically, but it does 
place limits on how individuals can choose to define and execute 
their private agreements.  Parties may be limited because they 
understand that a particular arrangement is prohibited (for 
example, a penalty clause in contract) or required (for example, 
certain forms of insurance for employees).50  But they may also be 
practically limited because the parties have an understanding of the 
likely outcome in court—for instance, what a jury would award in a 
tort case, or how a judge would allocate property in a divorce 
proceeding.51  A rational party to a contract who wishes to breach is 
unlikely to pay the disappointed promisee more than the sum of a 
court’s likely award plus transactions costs because he knows it is 
cheaper to go to court.  The idea of law as a framework to the 
parties’ negotiations is a really powerful one, and in this argument I 
want to leverage it with the following modification: as long as we are 
talking about private parties making decisions without the aid of 
counsel, behavior is bounded by the supposed legal rule, whether or 
not it is correct.  But what is that supposed legal rule?  In the 
contracts context, what parties think the law requires of them is 
neither entirely random nor entirely based in fact—studies suggest 
that people tend to believe that they are bound by the terms of the 
contract as written.52 
Evidence from a variety of substantive domains suggests that 
when people do not know the legal rule, they assume that it is in 
line with their intuitions.  When people do not know the criminal 
statutes that apply in a jurisdiction, they predict that the applicable 
law is the intuitive one.53  In family law, for example, people believe 
 
 48. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952 (1979). 
 49. Id. at 950. 
 50. Id. at 953–55. 
 51. See id. at 968–69 (explaining that in divorce proceedings, negotiations 
are affected by what solution the parties believe the court will impose in the 
absence of an agreement). 
 52. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and 
Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory 
Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997). 
 53. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 176 (2004) 
(presenting evidence that predictions of a legal rule reflect citizens’ respective 
moral intuitions). 
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not only that fault ought to matter for the division of property at 
divorce but that it does.54  Even when subjects are informed that 
fault is irrelevant for the division of property, they predict that the 
judge will nonetheless take it into account.55  In this Part, I make 
two main claims about intuitive approaches to the law of contract.  
First, many people think that signing a contract is essentially a 
waiver of most rights, such that any promise formally consented to 
is binding.  Second, they think that the available (and perhaps 
default) legal remedies include specific performance and punitive 
damages—remedies that reflect the underlying violation of promise 
breaking.56 
A. Formality and Enforceability 
My first claim is that people think that the legal system holds 
parties to the explicit terms of their contracts.  This has implications 
for various contract doctrines on unenforceable terms.  At the 
anecdotal level, many law professors have the sense that first-year 
law students are surprised to learn about the rule against penalty 
clauses.  They believe that if the parties contracted for the penalty, 
then the court will enforce it.  Studies have also observed this effect.  
For example, one study found that subjects who read a contract with 
an exculpatory clause reported that they would be less likely to sue 
than subjects who read the same contract without the exculpatory 
clause—even though the clause would almost certainly be 
unenforceable.57  As Lawrence Cunningham has pointed out, it also 
means that the notion of consideration is often ignored; most people 
think that promises to make gifts are legally enforceable.58  To the 
extent that ordinary citizens make an intuitive connection between 
promise and contract, they expect that any freely assumed 
contractual obligation may be enforced, in the same way that we 
would hold someone accountable for breaking an ill-considered but 
nonetheless freely made promise.59 
 
 54. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 991–92 (explaining that 
even in the wake of no-fault regime, divorce proceedings have retained their 
adversarial nature). 
 55. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting 
Moral and Legal Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 317 (2008). 
 56. There are almost certainly other contract doctrines that people find 
counterintuitive or misguided, but they are not yet part of the behavioral canon.  
I suspect many people believe that contracts must be written and signed, for 
example. 
 57. See Stolle & Slain, supra note 52, at 91. 
 58. Lawrence Cunningham, Popular Misconceptions About Contracts, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07 
/popular-misconceptions-about-contracts.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 59. Id. 
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B. Specific Performance and Punitive Damages 
An intuitive account of contract law also diverges from the 
actual common law in the area of remedies.  Many people have the 
intuition that as long as both parties legitimately agreed to the 
bargain, the court will “throw its weight on the side of performance” 
in the famous words of Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Bailey v. 
Alabama.60  This means that they think that specific performance is 
common and appropriate even in cases in which damages are easy to 
estimate.  In one study, subjects were presented with six fairly run-
of-the-mill breach of contract scenarios.61  The harms were minor 
and easily calculable.62  Nonetheless, more than half of the subjects 
not only believed that specific performance was appropriate in many 
of the cases but predicted that at least one of the cases would result 
in an award of specific performance.63  Along these lines, subjects 
also believed that a judge could and would award punitive damages 
in these contracts cases, punishing willful breachers.64  Similarly, in 
a number of studies, subjects have indicated an overall preference 
for damages above the expectation level—in other words, they seem 
to want to impose punitive damages.65 
In all, when ordinary citizens guess (and guess wrongly) about 
the legal rules governing contract, they assume that the terms of the 
agreement are first and foremost guided by the text of the contract 
and, in turn, that the court’s enforcement is motivated by that 
principle, holding people as closely as possible to their actual 
promises and punishing them for the wrong of promise breaking. 
III.  SOCIAL AND MORAL NORMS 
Parties to a contract consider themselves to be constrained by 
the legal rules of contract, the social and moral norms of the culture 
in which they are contracting, and the party- or transaction-specific 
norms relevant to the particular contract in question.  This Part 
addresses the role of cultural norms in the psychological contract.  
At least in the context of American contract law, behavioral research 
has identified two important norms.  First, most people believe that 
they have a moral obligation to keep their promises.66  Second, the 
 
 60. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 247 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Cunningham, supra note 58. 
 61. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 5, at 291–92. 
 62. Id. at 292–93.  For example, subjects read scenarios about contracts for 
minor home improvements like painting or floor refinishing. 
 63. Id. at 298. 
 64. See id. at 296, 298. 
 65. See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 414–19 (showing a 
mean and median preferred damages level above the expectation level in three 
experimental questionnaire studies). 
 66. Id. at 405. 
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contractual obligation is affected by the norm of fairness, 
encouraging parties to reward trust with trustworthiness and to 
punish selfishness with breach.67 
A. Promise Keeping 
It is hard to overstate the importance of promise keeping for 
human cultures.  Every known society has espoused a moral rule 
requiring individuals to honor their promises to one another.68  
Contract scholars were analyzing contract doctrine in terms of the 
moral requirements of promising well before Charles Fried’s book,69 
and modern philosophers of contract continue to argue that contract 
law is all about promising.70  This has also played out in the 
descriptive literature.  Relational contract studies speak specifically 
to the notion of promise, detailing the importance of 
extracontractual promising for the psychological contract.71  Even in 
one-shot games, players in experimental settings are much more 
likely to cooperate if they have promised to do so.72  Promise keeping 
is a strong norm. 
Behavioral researchers have struggled with the question of why 
people keep their promises, an issue with real implications for 
contract law.  One theory is that people have general other-
regarding preferences and do not want others to be disappointed; 
promising generally creates a set of expectations, and that is why 
breaking a promise is bad.  Alternatively, we may think that people 
have a strong preference for honoring their freely undertaken 
commitments, in which case it is the promise itself, not the resultant 
expectations, that contains the core of the moral obligation.  
 
 67. Id. at 421–22. 
 68. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of 
Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1653–54 (2007). 
 69. FRIED, supra note 2; see, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 553, 578 (1933); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An 
Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 576, 588–90 (1969); 
George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1932). 
 70. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 709 (2011); Shiffrin, supra note 1. 
 71. See Bagchi, supra note 70, at 752 (explaining that commercial 
promisors often make extralegal representations that are not included in the 
written expression of their agreements). 
 72. See, e.g., Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Promises and 
Partnership, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1579, 1579 (2006) (showing experimental 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that people strive to live up to others’ 
expectations in order to avoid feeling guilty); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Behavior, 
Communication, and Assumptions About Other People’s Behavior in a Commons 
Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1977) (finding that 
when players announce their intentions to behave generously they are more 
likely to do so than if they simply get to know one another). 
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Experimental evidence suggests that there is real support for the 
latter explanation—that the preference is at least partially 
dependent on the promise itself.73 
Decision researcher Christoph Vanberg used a “Dictator Game” 
to test the explanations.74  In a Dictator Game, the Dictator is given 
some amount of money and then instructed to offer any or none of it 
to the Recipient.75  The Recipient receives whatever was offered, and 
the game is over.76  Players typically do not meet face-to-face and 
communicate only by computer.77  In this version, players were 
paired up before being assigned their roles and told that the 
Dictators would be able to make one of two choices: either to keep 
fourteen Euros and give nothing to the Recipient, or to keep ten 
Euros and give the Recipient a five-sixths chance of receiving twelve 
Euros (with a one-sixth chance of receiving nothing).78  Most pairs 
exchanged promises that the Dictator would choose the sharing 
option.79  After the players were told their roles, half of them were 
switched to new partners.80  Then the Dictators made their 
choices.81  Vanberg found that Dictators were less likely to share 
when they were matched with a new partner, even if they knew that 
the new partner had been promised sharing by her previous 
partner.82  Thus, in two situations with equally deserving, expectant 
promisees, the players most likely to be generous were those who 
had made the particular promise, to the particular counterparty, to 
be generous. 
Evidence from this controlled, incentive-compatible experiment 
comports with reports from formal and informal surveys of 
contracting parties.  For example, self-reported data from a study of 
moral intuitions in contract indicate that people think that breaking 
a contract is more morally culpable and ought to be more severely 
punished than an identical harm in tort.83  That means that the 
broken promise is treated as an additional blameworthy act.  In 
theory, people could believe that a promise in contract is the kind of 
 
 73. Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An 
Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1467, 1467 (2008). 
 74. Id. at 1469. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1469–71. 
 77. Id. at 1471. 
 78. Id. at 1469. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1471–72. 
 81. Id. at 1472. 
 82. Id. at 1473. 
 83. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 405 (reporting 
questionnaire results showing that subjects believed that higher fines should be 
levied against a breacher than a tortfeasor and that the breacher’s conduct was 
more immoral). 
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promise that Holmes envisioned—a promise to either perform or pay 
damages.84  Substantial evidence suggests that this is not the case.85  
For most ordinary citizens, keeping one’s word means actually 
undertaking the promised performance.  As one participant in an 
earlier study of my own commented, “[p]eople should be held to their 
word, and a contract is the legally binding word.”86 
B. Fairness 
The intuitive connection between promise and contract is so 
strong that it can obscure the equally important relationship 
between contract and notions of fairness.  Contracts in the American 
common law tradition require promising (mutual assent), but that is 
not, of course, sufficient.  There must also be consideration—a 
mutuality of obligation, or an exchange.87  It is this element of 
exchange that implicates fairness norms.  You can break a promise 
without being unfair to the promisee, but any exchange is subject to 
judgments about the fairness of each party’s formal obligations and 
actual performance.  In contract law, courts formally take up 
fairness questions in a variety of contexts that deal with the nature 
of the parties’ obligations to one another: when they consider 
whether the promise is illusory,88 when they decide whether a party 
has breached,89 and when they decide whether the contract is 
unconscionable.90  Individuals also understand their obligations 
with reference to fairness norms.  Within contracts, parties have to 
make a number of decisions about how to perform—decisions that 
are essentially guided by the terms of the psychological contract.  In 
this Subpart, I argue that parties understand their obligations in 
terms of reciprocity and bounded self-interest. 
 
 84. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 247–49 (1911) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 85. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 407–08. 
 86. Participants’ Comments to Online Study (July 28, 2006) (unpublished 
comments on file with author) (study available at http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu 
/~baron/ex/tess/con3.htm). 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (“To constitute 
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (N.Y. 
1917) (inferring a duty to promote sales where there would otherwise be no 
consideration). 
 89. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Tailored Woman, 128 
N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. 1955) (holding there was no breach where the defendant 
acted in such a way that did not maximize the plaintiff’s profits, but did so in 
good faith). 
 90. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448–50 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965) (holding a contract invalid where terms were unreasonably favorable 
for the defendant). 
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1. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity norms cut in two directions.  First, people often 
reward trust or generosity with trustworthiness and reciprocal 
generosity.  Second, they respond punitively to selfishness and 
greed. 
The implications of positive reciprocity norms for contract are 
straightforward.  There are lots of ways in which parties have 
leeway in how they treat one another.  Reciprocal generosity may 
take the form of allowing minor delays or modifications without 
complaint, performing fully rather than shirking on the margins, or, 
when breach is more profitable than performance, performing and 
forgoing an additional profit.  In a typical contractual exchange, the 
promisor has at least two reasons to be generous toward the 
promisee.  First, the promisee has chosen the promisor from the 
group of possible counterparties.  This confers a material benefit on 
the promisor (for example, landing a job) and signals that the 
promisee believes that the promisor is trustworthy.  Second, the 
promisee has often already begun or even completed performance. 
The paradigmatic experimental design used to demonstrate this 
type of reciprocity is the “Trust Game,” and it has been used by a 
number of scholars to test explicitly contractual hypotheses.91  The 
Trust Game has two players: an Investor and a Trustee.92  The 
Investor is endowed with some amount of money, often ten dollars, 
and advised that she may pass any amount of it to the Trustee.93  
Any money passed to the Trustee triples so that the Trustee receives 
three times the amount that the Investor gives up.94  In the last 
move of the game, the Trustee may pass back some of her 
endowment to the Investor.95  In various iterations on this game, 
experimenters have demonstrated that Investors usually make a 
positive amount of money on their investments in Trustees, even 
though Trustees have no extrinsic incentive to give away any of 
their money.96 
The moral and social norm of positive reciprocity is clearly 
relevant in contract law, but the parallel norm of retaliation is also 
 
 91. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract 
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 131, 133 (2001) 
(using a Trust Game to test the effect of enforcement on contract performance); 
see also Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: 
Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 836 (1997) (using a repeated 
Trust Game to demonstrate the effect of opportunities for reciprocity on worker 
effort in the employment contract context). 
 92. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 122, 123 (1995). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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important, if less obvious.  Negative reciprocity comes into play with 
respect to both breach and performance: aggrieved parties will want 
to punish selfish breaches of contract, and selfish or distrusting 
behavior by one party will decrease the other party’s incentives to 
perform.97  People experience breach of contract as a betrayal, and 
when they believe that the other party has been selfish, greedy, or 
dishonest, the desire to punish is exacerbated.98  Subjects in 
questionnaire experiments report that they think that greedy 
breachers should be punished more severely than unfortunate 
breachers.99  They are more sympathetic toward accidental breaches 
than otherwise identical breaches caused by minor shirking and are 
apt to punish dishonesty more harshly than ineptitude, holding the 
magnitude of harm constant.100 
Even when the parties remain in the contract, negative 
reciprocity norms may affect performance.  The classic case is the 
self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust—a promisor who believes she is 
not trusted and is untrustworthy in response.  Entering a contract is 
often an indication in itself of a party’s trust for her counterparty.  
However, by the terms of their agreements, parties can choose and 
express their respective levels of trust.  One indicator of distrust is 
monitoring.101  The paradigmatic example of this might be in the 
childcare context.  Parents can choose to trust that their babysitters 
are going to be hard working, kind, and responsive—or they can buy 
a NannyCam and watch for themselves.  Swiss economist Bruno 
Frey has modeled the worker’s utility function with the inclusion of 
a “conscience” element and has argued that if there is no mutual 
trust relationship with the employers, the employee’s marginal 
benefit from work effort may be overcome by “profitable shirking.”102  
When a psychological contract exists between parties, increased 
monitoring is perceived to be an indication of distrust, in turn 
inducing the monitored parties to put less effort into their work.103 
This model has been borne out experimentally.  In one 
laboratory game, players were partnered in a principal-agent 
relationship.104  The agent began the game with an endowment, and 
 
 97. Id. at 138. 
 98. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 421. 
 99. Id. at 405. 
 100. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1032–33 (2010). 
 101. See Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Moral Hazard, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 97, 
98 (1995) (explaining how monitoring is one way in which contracting parties 
may ensure compliance under a contract, but arguing that doing so is costly). 
 102. Bruno S. Frey, Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with 
Trust and Loyalty, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 663, 665 (1993). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1611, 1614 (2006). 
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the principal with nothing.105  The primary task for the game was 
for the agent to decide on a productivity level (essentially a decision 
about how to share the endowment), choosing from a predetermined 
set of productivity levels.106  The principal was permitted to further 
restrict the decision set to raise the minimum productivity.107  
Experimenters compared the agent’s productivity in three 
conditions: no productivity requirement, exogenous productivity 
requirement (for example, experimenter raised the minimum), or 
principal-chosen productivity requirement.108  When there was no 
requirement for productivity, agents were productive—more 
productive or generous than would be expected if they were strict 
wealth maximizers.109  When the productivity requirement was 
exogenously determined, they remained overall fairly generous.110  
However, when the principal set the productivity requirement, 
productivity fell to the bare minimum.111  There was a “hidden cost” 
to control, in the sense that when the principals used formal controls 
over the agents, the agents reported that the productivity 
requirement from the principal was a signal of distrust.112 
There is evidence that this negative reciprocity has effects in 
contextualized contracts studies as well as in the real world.  
Studies of liquidated damages clauses113 and contract assignment,114 
respectively, have offered evidence that people are more willing to 
breach contracts in which their counterparties have made these self-
protective moves.  One salient example of negative reciprocity in 
high-stakes, real-world contracting involves strategic default on 
subprime mortgages.  In a number of debates over the economic and 
moral implications of defaulting on a home loan, commenters have 
suggested that walking away from an underwater loan seems much 
less problematic when the counterparty is a bank that has itself 
acted in bad faith by peddling subprime loans in already vulnerable 
communities.115  Parties to contracts have real power to adjust their 
behavior to respond to the moral and social incentives and 
reciprocity. 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1617. 
 110. Id. at 1619. 
 111. Id. at 1621. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral 
Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1549–50 (2011). 
 114. Id. at 1574. 
 115. Id. at 1564. 
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2. Bounded Self-Interest 
When parties enter into a contractual relationship, they change 
their interpersonal stance.  They may not become friends or 
partners, but they are no longer permitted to exploit every weakness 
or grab every advantage.  In contract law, this principle is espoused 
in the duty of good faith and fair dealing.116  In the psychological 
contract, the colloquial understanding of this duty has some 
particular parameters: parties often believe that it is fine to protect 
a profit at the expense of others but unfair to seek to increase a 
profit at their expense.117  Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and 
Richard Thaler refer to this as the “reference transaction,” a term 
that explicitly refers to the underlying Prospect Theory mechanism 
behind the effect.118  Of course, economists would say that the 
distinction between seeking and keeping a profit is essentially 
meaningless, insofar as it depends entirely on framing.119  The idea 
is that parties evaluate the fairness of a party’s actions by looking to 
the reference transaction.120  In the contract context, the reference 
transaction is the original contract.  An example from the original 
paper is as follows: 
A small company employs several workers and has been 
paying them average wages.  There is severe unemployment in 
the area and the company could easily replace its current 
employees with good workers at a lower wage.  The company 
has been making money.  The owners reduce the current 
workers’ wages by 5 percent.121 
Seventy-seven percent of respondents thought this was 
unfair.122  But if the company’s position is different, the norm 
changes.  When subjects read that “[t]he company has been losing 
money.  The owners reduce the current workers’ wages by 5 
percent,” only thirty-two percent thought that the wage-cut was 
unfair.123  In this example, the contract is the employment contract 
between the company and its workers.  The contract is for a certain 
kind of labor in return for a specified wage.  The original terms are 
the “reference transaction.”  The firm is permitted to “breach”—to 
 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance 
and its enforcement.”). 
 117. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 728 (1986). 
 118. Id. at 729. 
 119. Id. at 731. 
 120. Id. at 729. 
 121. Id. at 733. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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deliver less than it promised in the original contract—in order to 
protect its original profits.  It is not permitted to burden the other 
party in order to add to its own benefit. 
Oliver Hart and John Moore have used the idea of the reference 
transaction in their development of a model of behavior called 
“contracts as reference points.”124  Hart and Moore posit that 
contracts shape parties’ expectations, and thus their evaluations of 
outcomes.125  As such, parties who enter into low-profit deals and 
earn low profits are content; parties who enter into more flexible 
deals and earn the same low profits are aggrieved.126  This 
prediction was tested by Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart, and Christian 
Zehnder using a laboratory game.127  I describe the game in detail 
here because its results have very interesting implications for 
contract.  Participants in the game were assigned to be either buyers 
or sellers who participate in an auction.128  Buyers could choose to 
offer a rigid contract with a fixed price determined by the auction or 
a flexible contract in which the auction determined only the lower 
bound of the price.129  Once buyers and sellers were paired, they 
were informed about the “state of nature” or the market value of the 
trade.130  If the contract is rigid, the state of nature has no effect on 
the trade because the price is set.131  If the contract is flexible, the 
buyer chooses how to set the price within the established bounds.132  
The final decision is the seller’s: the seller can choose what level of 
“quality” to provide—in this game, choosing low quality means 
choosing unilaterally to decrease the buyer’s profit.133  The main 
variable of interest is how sellers respond to low profits across 
contract types (rigid vs. flexible) when the value of the trade is 
high.134  When the contract is rigid, they offer normal quality—that 
is, they do not do anything to decrease the buyer’s profit.135  When 
the contract is flexible, however, sellers are more likely to offer low 
quality.136  This means that players did not retaliate when the buyer 
was selfish at the auction stage; they only retaliated when a buyer 
 
 124. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. 
ECON. 1, 1 (2008). 
 125. Id. at 2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ernst Fehr et al., Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence, 
101 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 493 (2011). 
 128. Id. at 497. 
 129. Id. at 498. 
 130. Id. at 499. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  at 507. 
 136. Id. 
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with flexibility was selfish at the performance stage.  Once the 
buyer is in the contract, he is no longer permitted to raise his own 
profits at the expense of the seller’s expected profit. 
The idea of the contract as a reference point for understanding 
expectations helps to explain, and predict, a variety of contract 
behaviors.  For example, experimental evidence suggests people are 
more sympathetic toward a breacher who breaks a deal in order to 
avoid an unexpected loss than they are toward a breacher who 
breaks a deal to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity for 
gain.137  A party who asks for an increase in the contract price to 
respond to an increase in costs of materials is regarded as sensible, 
but one who asks for a higher price in response to increased demand 
or need is regarded as exploitative.138  Most people are highly loss 
averse, and this aversion helps define the boundaries of fair dealing 
within the contract.139 
IV.  PARTY-SPECIFIC NORMS 
The previous Parts argued that the psychological contract 
encompasses background norms of fairness and promise keeping.  
These are general norms, norms that most people take into account 
by default.  In this Part, I turn to the more idiosyncratic norms that 
form between two parties to a contract.  These unwritten elements 
of the agreement may be the result of explicit communication 
between the parties, or they may come about in the context of a 
long-term exchange relationship in which the parties’ behaviors 
have become predictable. 
A. Customs, Relationships, and Contracts 
In many ways, the existence of party-specific norms is one of the 
easiest propositions to defend to a contracts audience.  This is a 
concept that has been around for a long time, and one that began 
with traditional legal scholars rather than social scientists.  In 1963, 
Stewart Macaulay interviewed both businessmen and attorneys 
practicing in Wisconsin.140  He found that when parties to a 
contractual exchange were engaged in repeated similar 
transactions, they often relied on “normal business patterns” to 
define their obligations.141  When disputes arose, most interviewees 
reported that they preferred to settle the matter without reference 
 
 137. Wikinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 100, at 1041–43. 
 138. Kahneman et al., supra note 117, at 729. 
 139. Id. at 731. 
 140. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). 
 141. Id. at 58. 
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to the written contract, and certainly without resort to formal 
dispute resolution.142 
The importance of repeated transactions is clear not only for 
contract dyads but for small communities with known standards of 
transacting.  In such cases, parties know how others have behaved 
in the past even if they have not been directly involved with one 
another.  One of the most interesting case studies in Macaulay’s 
study involved the colloquial view of “cancelling an order” as distinct 
from breaching a contract.  One business lawyer reported: 
Often businessmen do not feel that they have “a contract”—
rather they have “an order.”  They speak of “cancelling the 
order” rather than “breaching our contract.”  When I began 
practice I referred to order cancellations as breaches of 
contract, but my clients objected since they do not think of 
cancellation as wrong.143 
The rule of expectation damages was alive and well in 
Wisconsin in 1963, but it was understood among parties that it was 
not a part of the deal.  “You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at 
each other if you ever want to do business again,” said one 
purchasing agent.144  These parties had expectations of one another 
based on previous customs in that business.  This is not “custom” in 
the sense it is used in contract doctrine—it seems fairly clear that a 
suit for breach would be at least prima facie valid in the case of an 
order cancellation.  This is a custom that the parties treat as part of 
the contract, even though it conflicts with the explicit provisions of 
the written agreement. 
A parallel finding exists from Lisa Bernstein’s study of the 
diamond industry.145  For the purposes of this discussion, her 
findings can be broken down into two main observations.  First, 
diamond traders have a set of rules and norms in what is an 
unusually closed community.146  They have expectations of one 
another based on how members of this community have behaved in 
the past.147  Second, the diamond traders draft and exchange legally 
unenforceable agreements.148  Thus, the parties’ expectations of one 
another in a given transaction are entirely clear, and yet they do not 
depend on the background law of contracts.  In both the Macaulay 
example and the Bernstein research, we see contracts that can only 
 
 142. Id. at 61. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relationships in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 115, 115 (1992). 
 146. Id. at 119–21. 
 147. Id. at 121–22. 
 148. Id. at 121–23. 
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be understood with reference to the particular actors and cultural 
context. 
Even if parties do not follow particular community or industry 
norms, they may have a history with each other that provides a 
structure for understanding the meaning of the contract.  This 
concept is not foreign to contract law; the familiar decision from 
Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.149 is that the plaintiff may recover 
when the defendant should have known based on previous dealings 
that the plaintiff took silence to be a manifestation of assent to the 
contract.150  Even in less extreme cases, proponents of a relational 
contracting model have cited numerous examples of contracts whose 
expectations and methods are only discernible in the context of the 
long-term relationship of the parties involved.151 
Finally, aside from the particular customs of a community and a 
contracting dyad, the contract itself can impart information about 
what the parties expect from one another.  A review of informal 
norms in contractual relationships can make it sound as though 
contracts themselves are irrelevant—just pieces of paper passed 
back and forth as a formality, never read and rarely litigated.  This 
is of course not the case.  The basic terms of a contractual exchange 
are usually dictated by the contract itself.  In most cases, parties 
exchanging widgets for money need not rely on background or 
informal norms to understand the price or the goods required for 
performance.  Leaving that aside as a relatively uncontroversial 
proposition, I focus on other cases in which the written contract 
shapes the psychological contract.  These are cases in which the 
terms are (a) known and (b) contrary to the background norm.  By 
“known,” I mean primarily that the parties have read and 
understood the terms.  A term that the parties do not suspect exists 
has no effect on the psychological contract.  Whether a term is 
“contrary to a background norm” is a slightly fuzzier question, but 
the gist is that if the parties would otherwise assume a default rule 
that is different from the actual term, it will be psychologically 
salient.  In the next Subpart, I look at an example of a common 
contract term, a liquidated damages clause, to see how the written 
contract interacts with the background legal and moral norms. 
B. Liquidated Damages Case Study 
I have argued here and elsewhere that most people believe that 
they are bound to perform as promised.  Many people believe that 
 
 149. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893). 
 150. Id. at 495. 
 151. See, e.g., Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation 
Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 149 (2003) (explaining that relational contract 
theory has produced the “truism” that parties who contract with one another 
long term interact with one another differently than parties who do not). 
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specific performance is the legal remedy for breach of contract, and 
even when they know the legal rule, they still believe that the moral 
and social norm is performance.  Legally, of course, the contractual 
promise is a promise to perform or pay.  But this rule does not seem 
to affect parties’ behavior—unless it is written into the contract, in 
the form of a liquidated damages clause.  In an earlier work, I 
showed study participants a description of a contract and asked 
them to put themselves in the position of a would-be breacher, 
someone who faces the choice of whether and when to breach a 
contract when breach would be more profitable than performance.152  
Subjects who were told that the background rule was for damages 
were less likely to breach (for example, they required a greater 
financial incentive to breach) than subjects who were told that an 
identical damages provision was written into the contract in the 
form of a liquidated damages clause.153 
This result suggests two things about the psychological 
contract.  First, if the parties know the background law but do not 
think that it is in line with the informal norms at play, it is not 
incorporated into the contract.  If knowing the background rule were 
enough, it would not matter whether it was presented as a 
background rule or as a stipulation in the contract.  Second, the 
content of the contract does matter for how parties understand their 
obligations.  Subjects in that study commented that breach would be 
less morally problematic in the liquidated damages contract because 
the other party would not be blindsided.154  The possibility of breach 
was explicitly part of the deal. 
This case raises an interesting question of interpretation for 
contracts scholars looking to behavioral decision research.  
Experimental research has been documenting the effect of small 
sanctions on cooperation for over ten years.155  Researchers have 
shown that the introduction of a penalty for selfishness to a 
situation in which most people behave generously makes people 
more likely to behave selfishly.156  For example, if Investors institute 
a small penalty of, for example, $1.50 in a Trust Game for Trustees 
 
 152. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A 
Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 657 (2010). 
 153. Id. at 659. 
 154. Id. at 669. 
 155. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (presenting the now-famous Israeli daycare study, including 
evidence that parents asked to pay a fine when they were late to pick up 
children from daycare were actually more likely to be late than parents not 
formally penalized). 
 156. See Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions 
on Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 137 (2003) (showing evidence of lower 
levels of altruistic behavior when sanctions were available to punish 
selfishness). 
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who do not return generously, more Trustees choose to pay the 
penalty and keep the rest.157  Contracts scholars have naturally 
pondered the analogy between the Trustee in the Trust Game and a 
promisor tempted to breach a contract in a case when breach is more 
profitable than performance.158 
One possible interpretation of the weak sanction literature for 
contract is that contract law is just like the Trust Game with a 
sanction.  For parties who want to be selfish, contract law lays out 
the rules and essentially makes every contract into an option 
contract.  On this view, contract law itself nudges individuals to be 
rational wealth maximizers, and the liquidated damages clause is 
superfluous.  In fact, real-world contracting is unlike the Trust 
Game in that its contracts exist in a social and moral context.  Some 
people may not know the rule of expectation damages, and others 
may know it but believe that the moral and social rule favors 
performance.  In either case, the liquidated damages clause updates 
a party’s information about her obligations under the contract.  In 
this sense, the liquidated damages clause is a signal within the 
contract that the default norm (promise keeping, in this case) does 
not apply.  The parties can use the contract to define not only their 
particular obligations but also the general expectations and 
standards that they want to govern their particular relationship. 
V.  APPLICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
I have claimed that the framework set out above can help 
provide a general approach for understanding the content of the 
psychological contract.  In this Part, I use that framework to think 
systematically about some of the challenges and open questions in 
the behavioral contracts research. 
A. Sophisticated Actors 
One of the most important questions for scholars who discuss 
informal norms in contracts is whether such norms really apply to 
the kinds of people who regularly engage in commercial 
transactions.  Or, more pointedly, what is the psychological contract 
when neither party is an individual and both parties are 
represented by counsel?  When scholars talk about sophisticated 
actors or sophisticated players, they are referring to people with 
some combination of superior cognitive skills and relevant 
experience in the arena.159  The idea of sophisticated actors is often 
stretched beyond this to include anyone who appears to have strong 
wealth-maximizing preferences—commercial actors rather than 
 
 157. Id. at 137–38. 
 158. Id. at 140. 
 159. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 145. 
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consumers, and agents rather than principles, for example.160  One 
of the reasons one might dismiss psychological findings in the real-
world contracts context is that many contracts are between people 
who (a) are trying to make money and (b) have done this kind of 
thing before.  Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott put it this way: “[W]e 
speculate that individuals in laboratories may perform worse than 
officers of firms because experimental subjects have not been 
trained to make good decisions and are not subject to the pressures 
to maximize . . . .”161  For the purposes of my argument, I grant some 
of the premises of this objection to behavioral research.  It is 
probably true that the average director of a Fortune 500 company 
knows more about American contract law than people without 
comparable experience with contracts (or, at least, is less likely to 
sign an agreement without advice of counsel), and that he or she is 
more highly motivated to secure a profit, and maybe even less 
constrained by squishier moral or emotional approaches to 
contracting. 
That said this does not mean that there is no psychological 
contract, or that parties can afford to ignore it.  Let us take an 
example of a hypothetical contract for a big sale of goods from one 
large company to another.  Under what circumstances might we 
imagine that their interactions are defined by any informal norms 
not encapsulated in the contract or the background law?  First, we 
might think that it is precisely the goal of profit maximization that 
motivates parties to incorporate social norms into their contracts.  
There are reasons to think that parties stand to gain by being 
generous and relying on reciprocal generosity rather than formal 
rewards and sanctions.162  Among other concerns, contract 
negotiation is expensive.  Second, moral and social norms may have 
more bite, even in the business context, than many commentators 
have been willing to admit.  In mergers and acquisitions,163 in 
insurance,164 in corporate transactions,165 and even in securities,166 
 
 160. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the 
Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 331 (2011) (distinguishing 
between consumers and the special position of sophisticated parties whose 
wealth allows them to dominate contractual relationships). 
 161. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 551–52 n.18 (2003). 
 162. See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 91 (using a Trust Game to test the 
effect of enforcement on contract performance). 
 163. See, e.g., Benjamin Grossman, Another View: Rethinking Reverse Break-
Up Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009, 10:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com 
/2009/08/11/another-view-rethinking-reverse-break-up-fees/ (arguing that 
reverse break-up fees reduce the stigma that acquirers face if they back out of a 
deal). 
 164. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales 
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 
1426 (1993) (“The real promise of the insurance relationship is not ‘if X 
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there is evidence that some owners, directors, merchants, and 
salespeople value promise keeping.  This means both that 
sophisticated actors may prefer themselves to keep a promise and 
that they may punish others perceived to be promise breakers. 
Sophisticated actors may also rely on party-specific norms.  
Diamond wholesalers and retailers, for example, rely on industry 
norms.167  Macaulay’s Wisconsin businessmen had patterns of 
interaction with one another, such that each party understood his 
mutual obligations, but the understanding was quite separate from 
the written agreement.168  This is not so unusual.  The modern case 
used to illustrate the “battle of the forms” under the Uniform 
Commercial Code is Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology,169 a dispute that is all about parties trading forms back 
and forth with various conflicting terms, but agreeing among 
themselves that only some of the terms would be enforceable.170  
Even when the contract in question is between two corporations, it 
is worth asking whether industry practices or extracontractual 
promises are incorporated into the psychological contract. 
Of course, commercial actors are not always paired with other 
commercial actors.  In fact, the vast majority of contracts are 
contracts between individual consumers and their corporate 
counterparties.171  In these cases, rational-maximizing companies 
may prefer to exploit every permissible advantage—but they do not, 
because they fear reputation effects.  If, for example, consumers 
expect companies to waive certain late fees or penalties when there 
is a good (but not legally cognizable) excuse, the companies may 
choose to do so, even though they are not so obligated under the 
formal contract.  Similarly, a service provider dealing with a 
homeowner may decide not to breach, even if breach would be 
efficient and the homeowner could be fully compensated, because 
the service provider believes that the homeowner would be angry in 
the event of breach.  In experimental research on moral harm in 
 
happens, we’ll pay Y dollars’, but rather ‘we’ll be there for you,’ keeping your life 
or business together when disaster strikes.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1999) (arguing that corporate law is sensitive to 
moral and social norms including trustworthiness and loyalty). 
 166. See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV.  1955, 1959 (2001) 
(observing that informal norms of honesty can augment federal securities law). 
 167. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 168. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 169. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 170. Id. at 96–98. 
 171. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1971) (observing that 
standard form contracts account for more than ninety-nine percent of all 
contracts entered into). 
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contract, a number of participants have volunteered that they would 
be unwilling to breach a contract because of the reputation effects.172  
For example, one study surveyed law students on their attitudes 
toward efficient breach, showing them a situation in which the 
breacher would fully compensate the promisee.173  The respondents 
said that they would need to earn a significant premium over the 
efficient amount to be willing to breach, and many cited reputation 
effects.174  For example: “I think in all the situations it is 
economically efficient to breach the contract and give compensation 
to the party suffering the breach, but I think it is unwise in terms of 
potentially harming the breacher’s reputation to do so,” or “To the 
extent that breaking a promise hurts his reputation, it is a bad 
business decision.”175 
Sometimes, the question about sophisticated parties is framed 
in terms of repeat players.176  This is a similar idea—both are 
assumed to have acquired superior skills in one way or another, and 
thus to be less vulnerable to cognitive biases.  The repeat player 
concern mainly highlights the importance of reputation.  Thus, on 
the one hand, we may believe that repeat players learn how to 
minimize their mistakes, but they may also learn the norms of the 
interaction such that they are less likely to offend the counterparty 
and suffer the consequences. 
Legal scholars are sometimes skeptical that behavioral-decision 
research could bear on the kinds of contracts that drive most 
contract law and policy—sale of goods, construction contracts, and 
contracts of adhesion.177  But this research is about more than 
heuristic reasoning and cognitive bias.  It also aims to describe how 
people across a variety of contexts rely on informal norms rather 
than formal rules to shape their behavior.178  Sophisticated actors 
may not mistake norms for rules, but that does not mean that they 
do not take informal norms seriously, whether because of their own 
personal moral commitments, because they believe that informal 
contracts are efficient contracts, or because they believe that others 
expect them to conform and will punish them if they do not. 
 
 172. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 423. 
 173. Online Survey (Sept. 5, 2008) (unpublished comments on file with 
author) (full survey available at http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex 
/tess/con12l.htm). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on 
Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1057 
(2009) (describing the “repeat player effect,” in which sophisticated companies 
obtain favorable outcomes in a significant proportion of arbitration disputes 
against consumers). 
 177. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 152, at 634–35. 
 178. Id. at 635. 
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B. Individuals and Institutional Counterparties 
Many people share the intuition that the commonsense moral 
requirements for contracts obligations shift (down, usually) when we 
are in a contract with a corporate counterparty.  It is one thing to 
think that people adhere to shared moral norms when they are 
dealing with other individuals—counterparties with a name and a 
face, as it were.179  The demands of moral norms may be different, 
though, with respect to a contract with a company.  Imagine a 
person who has agreed to rent a cottage for a summer vacation and 
then finds out that something better and cheaper is available 
(imagining, for the moment, that for one reason or another damages 
are unlikely).  We would not be surprised to find that many more 
people would stick to the original contract if the cottage was owned 
by, say, the Smith family than if the cottage belonged to the 
Marriott Hotels corporation. 
But what is the difference?  Why do we have this intuition, and 
when does the identity of the counterparty matter for the 
psychological contract?  As a preliminary matter, I do not think the 
difference lies in the legal norms.  There is no obvious reason to 
believe that individuals are more likely to think that the law expects 
performance when they are dealing with other individuals than 
when they are dealing with corporations—and, indeed, if anything, 
we might think that they believe corporations are more likely to 
enforce contracts through litigation. 
This leaves two other sets of normative expectations that might 
differ based on the nature of one’s counterparty: the social and 
moral norms and the particulars of the contract relationship.  I have 
posited two overarching moral norms associated with contract: 
promise keeping and fairness.  My suggestion here is that the moral 
norm of promise keeping has the same basic purchase in most 
contexts.  For many people, keeping a promise is essentially a 
personal moral commitment.  Going back on your word is a moral 
wrong whether the promise was to your grandmother or to your 
mortgage broker.  However, contracts require not only promises but 
bargains, and this is where we may see systematic differences 
between contracts with individuals and contracts with corporations.  
Reciprocity matters for contracts generally, of course, and in any 
contract where one party starts to shirk or act in bad faith, we can 
expect retaliation.  Even absent actual stinginess, corporations may 
be perceived as being categorically undeserving of generosity, 
irrespective of their performance in a particular contract.  First, 
 
 179. See generally, e.g., Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About 
Consciousness: Experimental Studies, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67 
(2008) (comparing human counterparties to corporate counterparties). 
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people think that corporations are generally greedy.180  In the 
current social and economic climate, for example, people explicitly 
blame corporate free riding for the economic woes of the lower and 
middle class.181  Second, people may think that breaching a contract 
with a firm does not result in the same level of economic harm as 
breaching a contract with an individual, insofar as firms are both 
wealthier and better able to spread the loss across many individuals.  
Thus, the social and moral norm of fairness may have systematically 
different implications for individuals in contracts with large 
corporations. 
In general, contracts with individuals will also have a very 
different relational feel to them than contracts with big 
corporations.  Individuals with credit cards, for example, are highly 
unlikely to have any specialized or informal understandings with 
their credit card companies in the manner of the Wisconsin 
businessmen from Macaulay’s studies.  However, corporate 
contracts may nonetheless convey information about the kind of 
promissory obligation the firm has in mind.  For instance, when a 
cell phone contract includes a penalty for early termination, 
individuals may understand the company to be communicating that 
this is not a contract based on informal trust norms.182  When a 
mortgage lender sells a homeowner’s loan to a third party, it serves 
as a signal to the borrower that the loan is an impersonal 
transaction and not a personal promise.183  In sum, there are 
reasons to predict, based on behavioral findings, that the 
psychological contract between an individual and a company invokes 
fewer moral obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
The economic and legal foundation of contracts is grounded in 
expectations.  Parties enter contracts because they expect to be 
better off.  When contracts fail, damages are measured in terms of 
the parties’ expectations (limited, of course, by doctrines like 
avoidability and certainty).  Contracts scholars need a way to 
approach the question of what the parties expect without devolving 
into an exercise in individual mindreading.  This Essay presents a 
 
 180. JOHN MACKEY, WHOLE FOODS, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM para.1 (2007) 
available at http://www.wholeplanetfoundation.org/files/uploaded/John_Mackey 
-Conscious_Capitalism.pdf (“Instead corporations are widely perceived as 
greedy, selfish, exploitative, and uncaring – and interested only in maximizing 
profits.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Editorial, The Corporate Free Ride, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008, 
at A18 (referring to the “fundamental unfairness” of the American corporate tax 
system). 
 182. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 152, at 650. 
 183. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 113, at 1573–74. 
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framework to describe the makeup of the psychological contract.  
This approach pulls together the different strands of scholarship 
that have taken an empirical approach to contract: the intuitive 
moral connection between contract and promise, the evidence from 
experimental economics of strong preferences for equity and 
reciprocity, and the focus on reputation and personal relationships 
from relational contracting.  The world of contracts is big and 
diverse.  The psychological contract construct is a systematic way to 
assess the social, moral, and practical meaning of promissory 
obligations. 
